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 Abstract 
This paper examines the progression of the Kumarangk (Hindmarsh Island) case, and 
the legal construction of public participation in the making of political decsions. In the 
process of examining the politics of competing interests in land, the paper reflects on the 
challenge of the tension between Indigenous interests in land and developmentalism in 
relation to the Australian jurisprudence of procedural fairness and natural justice. The 
argument running through the article concerns the question of how the liberal restraint 
on power, where that power creates rather than infringes upon rights, may also play its 
role in the maintenance of relations of settler-colonial dispossession. 
 
 You get 100% for law and zero for politics.1 
 
In Mr Sebastian’s affidavit he refers to what he describes as “white fella law”. By that 
reference, I have taken Mr Sebastian to be referring to the law of this country other than 
Aboriginal law. I do not think it is appropriate to describe that body of law as “white fella 
law”. The truth of the matter is that it is Australian law for all Australians regardless of their 
colour.2 
 
dministrative law scholars have come to emphasis over recent years that an 
appreciation of the various normative positions and political theories which underlie 
or constitute the “background” to public law is central to a proper understanding of its 
operations and effects. “Differing conceptions of both constitutional and administrative law,” 
writes PP Craig, “reveal themselves to be reflections of deeper controversies concerning 
differing conceptions of the democratic society in which we live”.3 In the Australian context, 
Margaret Allars has also remarked on the importance of an engagement with “the values and 
                                                 
 1 Robert Tickner to Senator Christabell Chamarette, in response to the Senator’s suggestion that he 
could make a declaration prior to obtaining Cabinet approval, because “You’re the minister”: Tickner v Bropho 
(1993) 114 ALR 409 at 429. 
 2 State of Western Australia & Others v Minister for Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1994) 54 
FCR 144 at 150, per Carr J (Crocodile Park 1) 
 3 Craig, PP, Public Law and Democracy in the United Kingdom and the United States of America (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990) at 4; see also Harlow, C, “Changing the mindset: the place of theory in English 
administrative law” (1994) 14(3) OJLS 419-34 and Loughlin, M, Public Law and Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992). 
A
understandings which underlie the legal system...providing a critique or advocating reform on 
the basis of a philosophical commitment”.4  
 One of the examples used by Allars is the set of Federal Court cases revolving around 
the application of the Commonwealth Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection 
Act 1984 (Heritage Act), concerning Kumarangk (Hindmarsh Island)5 and the Broome 
Crocodile Park.6 Her analysis indicates how their outcomes arose from the Federal Court’s 
particular construction of the democratic principles underlying the Heritage Act, principles 
which require “public participation to be effective and capable of making the minister’s 
decision informed and hence rational”.7 The theoretical perspectives at play in these cases 
include interest group pluralism and civic republicanism, and Allars also suggests that feminist 
political theory might be helpful in developing an approach to participation and procedural 
fairness capable of producing less divisive outcomes.8 
 In this essay I will use a critical examination of jurisprudence of the Heritage Act cases9 
to develop this line of argument specifically in relation to the politics of competing interests in 
land under settler-colonialism, as well as the broader significance of these cases for our 
understanding of the operation of law, the courts and judicial review in Australian political 
and social life. These cases are of particular interest because of the complex challenges posed 
by Indigenous interests in land to the liberal pluralist model of political and social life lying at 
the heart of contemporary public law, including the question of exactly how developmentalist 
interests in land are legitimately to be reconciled with those of the country’s Indigenous 
inhabitants.  
                                                 
 4 Allars, M, “Theory and administrative law: law as form and theory as substance” (1996) 79 Canb Bull 
Pub Admin 20 at 20 
 5 Chapman & Ors v Minister for Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Affairs & Ors (1995) 133 ALR 74; 55 
FCR 316 (Chapman v Tickner); Norvill v Chapman (1995) 133 ALR 226 
 6 Crocodile Park 1 note 2; State of Western Australia & Others v Minister for Aboriginal & Torres Strait 
Islander Affairs (1995) 37 ALD 633 (Crocodile Park 2); Minister for Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Affairs v 
State of Western Australia (1996) 66 FCR 40 (Crocodile Park 3) 
 7 Allars note 4 at 32 
 8 ibid at 28-9 
 9 Norvill v Chapman note 5 needs to be approached as one element, inter alia, of the body of natural 
justice jurisprudence which emerged around the other Heritage Act cases, for reasons which will become as we 
go. 
 The overall line of argument will be that it is important to reflect on the extent to 
which the jurisprudence of natural justice which has emerged in Australian courts is an 
example of what Stanley Fish calls “the trouble with principle”: the problematic moral and 
political outcomes of attempts to organize law around the application of supposedly neutral, 
abstract principles (such as the content of procedural fairness) made to operate in 
detachment from the specific social, historical and cultural characteristics of the particular 
situations to which those principles are being applied.10 Despite the repeated judicial 
assertions that the expression “procedural fairness” is meant to convey “the notion of a 
flexible obligation to adopt fair procedures which are appropriate and adapted to the 
circumstances of the particular case”,11 in these Heritage Act cases we find the same legal 
principles developed in the context of protecting potential deportees and the parents of 
tragically killed children from the actions of government, affording equal shelter to property 
developers impatient with Aboriginal resistance to the never-ending march of progress. 
Should we be questioning then, the extent to which judicial review, as well as restraining the 
power of government, may also be operating to maintain the existing power relations of settler 
colonialism? 
 
Between natural justice and ultra vires  
When the Chapmans took the Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs to 
the Federal Court in 1994 to challenge his declaration under the Heritage Act of Kumarangk 
as a site of Aboriginal heritage significance, Justice O’Loughlin found that there were two 
decisive problems with the way the declaration had been made. First, the notice published by 
the reporter, Professor Saunders (as required by s10(4)), was deficient because (a) it did not 
identify the area claimed as being of significance in Aboriginal culture clearly enough, and (b) 
the subject of women’s business emerged after the publication of the original notice, requiring 
further public notice.12 Second, the Act required the Minister to “consider” all the 
                                                 
 10 Fish, S, The Trouble with Principle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999) 
 11 Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 585, per Mason J; cf also Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v FCT 
(1963) 113 CLR 475 at 504, per Kitto J; Russell v Duke of Norfolk [1949] 1 All ER 109 at 118, per Tucker LJ 
 12 Chapmen v Tickner note 5 at 104, 121-2 
representations attached to Professor Saunder’s report; he both failed to give the whole body 
of representations enough of his “consideration”, and failed to “consider” himself those 
representations which were supposed to constitute the core of the case for heritage 
significance, the envelopes containing the details of the women’s business.13 
 The minister’s appeal was heard a year later, when the Full Bench confirmed 
O’Loughlin J’s judgment. In an “explanatory statement” preceding the judgment, the Court 
emphasised that the case did not turn solely on the question of whether the minister had read 
the material concerning women’s business.14 It was that defect in combination with others - 
that the minister had not read the other representations, that his decision had relied so 
heavily on the women’s business, and that the original public notice was deficient - which led 
the Court to confirm O’Loughlin J’s setting aside of the minister’s decision. 
 The two judgments move between the principles of procedural fairness - the rights of 
interested parties to have enough information to put an informed case - and ultra vires - did 
the Minister do as the Act requires him? The issue of adequate notice straddled both types of 
principle, being both a requirement of the Act and a reasonable procedural fairness 
requirement.15 The Full Bench’s hearing of the Minister’s appeal thus appears to render the 
concern with the “secrecy” of Aboriginal women’s religious beliefs16 rather superfluous and 
misplaced, with the critical legal issue being the Minister’s actions failing to conform to the 
requirements of the Act.  
 It is fair to say, then, that the question of the Chapmans’ right to question the 
legitimacy of the heritage significance of Kumarangk was effectively set aside,17 and that there 
is no real need to see things in terms of a fundamental conflict between Anglo-Australian and 
                                                 
 13 Chapman v Tickner note 5 at 123-5 
 14 Norvill v Chapman note 5 at 229 
 15 As O’Loughlin J put it, “The inadequacy of the notice meant that the Chapmans and Messrs Barton 
and Knott, along with other interested persons, were denied natural justice.  It also meant that the Minister 
lacked jurisdiction to make the s10 declaration” Tickner v Chapman note 5 at 128 
 16 Partington, G, “Determining sacred sites - the case of the Hindmarsh Island Bridge” (1995) 71(5): 
Current Affairs Bulletin 4-11 
 17 O’Loughlin J also pointed out that one of the Chapmans’ central points of contention, whether the 
claimants were the “real” traditional owners, was irrelevant under the terms of the Heritage Act, which “makes 
no reference to use, occupation or ownership;” “ it was not to the point that there may have been competing 
Aboriginal claimants with respect to areas that were said to be areas of significance to Aboriginals....I do not 
Aboriginal law; that the subsequent Royal Commission and legislative enforcement of the 
building of the bridge18 should be seen as relatively isolated cases of a lack of sympathy with 
Aboriginal culture, rather than a manifestation of a deep-seated conflict between different 
sets of legal and political principles. “With a small amount of adjustment and 
reinterpretation,” wrote Nathan Hancock, “it may be possible within the current system to 
establish cultural heritage claims without trespassing on the very Aboriginal laws, customs 
and traditions which the Heritage Act was intended to protect”.19 Margaret Allars also 
observes that contemporary administrative law can and does make exceptions to openness 
and full disclosure, especially when there are statutory provisions made.20   
 There were also a number of aspects of O’Loughlin J’s judgment which the Full Bench 
did not consider in Norvill v Chapman because they had fallen in the Minister’s favour, he was 
not appealing against them, nor were the Chapmans cross-appealing, which brought 
restrictions on disclosure from another quarter altogether. These concerned his Honour’s 
fuller position on procedural fairness, which included the question of an interested party’s 
right of access to information provided to the decision-maker. The Chapmans had argued 
that procedural fairness in this case required that they be provided with the details of the case 
for the significance of the area, in particular with a copy of Deane Fergie’s anthropological 
report on the women’s business, contained in one of the “secret envelopes”. 
 O’Loughlin J rejected this argument, stating that the statute did not require this of 
either the reporter or the Minister, particularly when balanced against the primary concern of 
the statute - the expeditious protection of areas and sites of Aboriginal heritage significance 
from damage and injury - within a particular time frame. For O’Loughlin J, then, Parliament, 
in its particular drafting of the Heritage Act, impliedly restricted the content of procedural 
                                                                                                                                                        
consider that there was any obligation on Professor Saunders to identify the “traditional owners” of the areas 
that were the subject of her report”: Chapman v Tickner note 5 at 112 
 18 Andrews, N, “Dissenting in paradise? The Hindmarsh Island Bridge Royal Commission” (1998) 5(1 
& 2) CanbLR 5-76; Harris, M, “The narrative of law in the Hindmarsh Island Royal Commission” in M Chanock 
and C Simpson (eds) Law and Cultural Heritage (Melbourne: La Trobe University Press, 1996) 115-39 [special 
issue of Law in Context 14(2)]; Pengelly, N, “Before the High Court: The Hindmarsh Island Bridge Act. Must 
laws based on the Race power be for the “benefit” of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders? And what has 
bridge building got to do with the race power anyway?” (1998) 20 SydLR 144-57 
 19 Hancock, N, “Disclosure in the public interest?  Is full disclosure of secrets required by current 
heritage legislation?”  (1996) 21(1) AltLJ 19 at 20 
fairness, through its imposition of a particular procedure and time frame on its overall aims 
and intentions.21 His Honour balanced the aims and intentions of the Act, its time 
constraints, and the requirements of procedural fairness in a way which places the outer limits 
of the content of procedural fairness at the achievement of the aims of the Act, limits which 
resulted in “no obligation on the part of the minister to give to [the Chapmans] any 
opportunity to make submissions on the reports of Professor Saunders and on the reports of 
such anthropologists and archaeologists as may have been referred to or relied upon by her in 
the compilation of her report”.22  
 Questions of confidentiality and the secret nature of Aboriginal religious beliefs thus 
seem to be positioned in the wings of the real legal issues governing the operation of the 
Heritage Act. At the same time, however, the very different treatment given to the principles 
governing the related question of disclosure by both Carr J and the Full Bench of the Federal 
Court, appear to move in entirely the opposite direction, in a way which returns the politics of 
competing interests in land back to the centre of the legal and political stage. But to 
understand that we first have to go back to the development of the High Court’s 
jurisprudence of natural justice. 
 
The Australian jurisprudence of procedural fairness  
In Annetts v McCann,23 Mason CJ, Deane and McHugh JJ drew attention to the historical 
change in the High Court’s understanding of the doctrine of procedural fairness by pointing 
out that the majority’s view in Testro Bros Pty Ltd v Tait,24 that a company inspector was not 
obliged to afford the affected company an opportunity to respond to matters which may give 
rise to adverse findings, would not prevail today. “It can now be taken as settled,” they wrote, 
“that, when a statute confers power upon a public official to destroy, defeat or prejudice a 
                                                                                                                                                        
 20 Allars note 4 at 30 
 21 Chapman v Tickner note 5 at 90 
 22 Chapman v Tickner note 5 at 94 
 23  (1990) 170 CLR 596 at 599-600; The development up to and including Kiao is discussed in Allars, 
M, “Fairness: write large or small?” (1987) 11 SydLR 306-25 
 24 (1963) 109 CLR 353 
person's rights, interests or legitimate expectations, the rules of natural justice regulate the 
exercise of that power unless they are excluded by plain words of necessary intendment”.25 
 Courts thus assume that Parliament intends the exercise of its powers, especially 
where they operate adverse to rights, interests and legitimate expectations, to be conducted 
according to the principles of procedural fairness: the legislative provisions creating, 
conferring or regulating an authority or power “are to be construed as impliedly requiring that 
[the] common law rules of procedural fair play be observed”.26 This presumption in turn 
requires a clear legislative intention to the contrary in the relevant statute if such an exercise 
of powers is to escape the common law’s implication of procedural fairness.27 However, as 
Mason J pointed out in Kioa, whether this is the case is rarely the critical issue; it is more often, 
“what does the duty to act fairly require in the circumstances of the particular case?”28. This 
will correspondingly depend on “the circumstances of the case and they will include, inter 
alia, the nature of the inquiry, the subject matter, and the rules under which the decision-
maker is acting,” seen “in the light of the statutory requirements, the interests of the 
individual and the interests and purposes, whether public or private, which the statute seeks 
to advance or protect or permits to be taken into account as legitimate considerations”.29 
 Although the precise content of procedural fairness varies from case to case, generally 
there remain two core concerns surrounding the exercise of a power adverse to particular 
rights, interests and legitimate expectations: first, the right to disclosure of the information 
forming the basis of the decision-maker’s determination and, second, the right to a hearing 
enabling a response to that information.30 In practice, the two concerns are often interrelated, 
                                                 
 25 Annetts v McCann note 23 at 598, per Mason CJ, Deane & McHugh JJ 
 26 State of South Australia v O’Shea (1987) 163 CLR 378 at 416, per Deane J 
 27 Annetts v McCann note 23 at 598, per Mason CJ, Deane and McHugh JJ; the line of authority for this 
construction runs through Commissioner of Police v Tanos (1958) 98 CLR 383 at 395-96; Twist v Randwick 
Municipal Council (1976) 136 CLR 106 at 109-110; Heatley v Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Commission (1977) 
137 CLR 487 at 496, 500; J v Lieschke (1987) 162 CLR 447 at 456; Haoucher v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic 
Affairs (1990) 169 CLR 648 at 680; Attorney General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 57 Ainsworth v 
Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564 at 574-575 
 28 Kioa note 11 at 585 
 29 Kioa note 11 at 583-5 
 30  “It is a fundamental rule of the common law doctrine of natural justice expressed in traditional terms 
that, generally speaking, when an order is to be made which will deprive a person of some right or interest or the 
legitimate expectation of a benefit, he is entitled to know the case sought to be made against him and to be 
given an opportunity of replying to it” Kioa note 11 at 582, per Mason J 
since perceived inadequate disclosure is frequently experienced as central to the inadequacy 
of the hearing. The entitlement to comment on “adverse material” does not, however, extend 
to the decision-maker’s “mental processes or provisional views” before the decision is made.31  
 One difficulty raised by this formulation of the doctrine of procedural fairness is that 
the complexity of what constitutes appropriate disclosure is left in the background. 
Information can come before a decision-maker over a period of time, some of it may of a 
nature such that disclosure would undermine the purposes of the exercise of power.32 Since 
the process of disclosure is time-consuming, any time restrictions placed on decision-making 
can constitute a barrier to disclosure, and  
there may also be other reasons for restricting access to the information forming the basis of 
the decision, confidentiality being the most obvious. In Kioa, for example, Brennan J 
restricted the opportunity “to deal with adverse information that is credible, relevant and 
significant to the decision to be made” to “the ordinary case where no problem of confidentiality 
arises”33. What remains relatively unexplored, then, is how the doctrine of natural justice is to 
operate in those “extraordinary” cases where a problem of confidentiality does arise, especially 
within the complex nexus between confidentiality and the principles governing disclosure, two 
areas of legal principle which need to be seen as intimately related to each other. 
 
Confidentiality 
Australian common law already makes a range of provisions for the confidentiality of 
information coming before the Court, under the broad umbrella of basing the rules governing 
the content of procedural fairness on the circumstances of the particular case.34 PD Finn has 
noted that restraints on disclosure arise in relation to trade secrets and commercial 
information, private and professional relationships, public and private institutions, and the 
                                                 
 31 Commissioner for ACT Reference v Alphone Pty Ltd (1994) 127 ALR 699 at 715, per Northrop, Miles 
and French JJ 
 32 National Companies and Securities Commission v News Corporation Limited (1984) 156 CLR 29 
 33 Kioa note 11 at 629 
 34 e.g.,Victorian Broadcasting Network (1983) Pty Ltd v Minister for Transport and Communications (1990) 
21 ALD 689 at 697-8, per Hill J 
“public interest”.35 Deane Fergie also observes, for example, that the developers in the 
Kumarangk case were equally concerned to protect their commercial confidences.36  
 The notion of “public interest immunity” was explored in detail in the Aboriginal 
Sacred Sites case37, where Woodward J said that “in this country, a fresh category of public 
interest immunity should be recognized, covering secret and sacred Aboriginal information 
and beliefs”.38 Although the Woodward J did maintain that the relevant legal claims had to be 
subject to some “forensic investigation”,39 his Honour saw no obstacle to place restrictions on 
disclosure such that it “would be kept to the necessary minimum”.40 However, this 
responsiveness in Australian law to the idea that some information should be regarded as 
confidential and protected by public interest immunity to a greater or lesser extent is sits 
rather uneasily alongside the Federal Court’s accompanying position on disclosure. 
 
Disclosure 
In the Broome Crocodile Park case, for example, Carr J stated categorically that “the material 
on each side should be disclosed to the other side,” subject to the reservation that “it may not 
always apply to all persons interested in whether a declaration is made under s.10”.41 The 
points accepted by Carr J included that procedural fairness required that  
C the applicants were made aware of all relevant materials which were before or 
considered by the Minister; 
C if the decision-maker was going to consider new material, disclosure of that new 
material to the other party. 
The jurisprudential foundations for this construction were identified as being Peko-Wallsend,42 
O'Shea43 and Kioa.44  
                                                 
 35 Finn, PD “Confidentiality and the “Public Interest”” (1984) 58 ALJ at 497; c.f. Sankey v Whitlam 
(1978) 142 CLR 1 
 36 Fergie, D, “Whose sacred sites? Privilege in the Hindmarsh Island Bridge debate” (1995) 72(2) 
Current Affairs Bulletin 14 at 20 
 37 Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority v Maurice (Re Warumungu Land Claim) (1986) 64 ALR 247 
 38  ibid at 256 
 39 ibid, at 271, per Toohey J 
 40 ibid at 256 
 41 Crocodile Park 2 note 6 at 678 
 42 Minister for Aboriginal Affairs & Another v Peko-Wallsend Ltd & Ors (1986) 162 CLR 24 
 On appeal, the Full Bench agreed. The opposing parties’ entitlement to “a proper 
opportunity to advance all legitimate arguments to avert a decision that might profoundly 
affect their interests” includes “proper notice of the case they have to meet”.45 Having the 
opportunity to “contradict or comment on” material before the Minister was seen as 
“consistent with and not at odds with the reporting and decision-making process envisaged by 
the Statute.”46 
 Both Carr J and the Full Bench considered that such disclosure requirements were 
capable of standing alongside conformity to any confidentiality concerns to the appropriate 
standard. In the absence of agreement on disclosure, stated the Full Bench, “upon a 
confidential and limited basis”, the requirements of natural justice “might well permit 
disclosure by the reporter subject to strict conditions designed to preserve confidentiality to 
the greatest extent possible in all the circumstances”.47 However, this rather lukewarm and 
diffident formulation, that procedural fairness “might well permit” disclosure which preserves 
confidentiality “to the greatest extent possible”, appears to prioritize disclosure above 
confidentiality, and it remains uncertain to what “extent” confidentiality would indeed be 
preserved. 
 Compare, for example, the words of Toohey J in the Aboriginal Sacred Sites case, who 
pointed out that a rejection of the public interest immunity argument did not have as its 
corollary the notion “that any documents in its possession or in the possession of others for its 
purposes must necessarily be disclosed to the public at large or even to all those participating 
in the proceedings of a court or tribunal”.48 Woodward J, too, made it much more explicit 
how the principles of disclosure and confidentiality should be balanced, and according to 
what principles: 
In my opinion, the proper protection of minority rights is very much in the public 
interest, as is respect for deeply held spiritual beliefs. In particular, the rights and 
                                                                                                                                                        
 43 O'Shea note 26 
 44 This position was also reiterated recently by Carr J in State of Western Australia v Native Title Registrar 
[1999] FCA 1593 (16 November 1999, unreported) 
 45 Crocodile Park 3 note 6 at 53 
 46  ibid at 54-6 
 47  ibid at 58 
 48 Aboriginal Sacred Sites note 37 at 271 
beliefs of the Aboriginal people of Australia should be accorded a special degree of 
protection and respect in Australian courts. Thus I can well imagine a court finding 
on balance, for example, that the outrage in an Aboriginal community caused by a 
forced disclosure of information about a sacred site, would outweigh the importance in 
that particular criminal or civil trial of precisely identifying the place or explaining 
why it was sacred.49  
 
In both the Crocodile Park and Kumarangk cases, however, it was not necessary for the Federal 
Court to deliberate on whether it should indeed frustrate the primary purpose of the Statute 
in favour of legislative aims concerning disclosure and fairness implied by the common law, 
primarily because the other procedural defects in the Minister’s action were so serious and 
inescapable.50  
 The concern shown by O’Loughlin J for balancing the principles of confidentiality and 
disclosure within the overall purpose of the Heritage Act thus resonates more with the earlier 
approaches of Woodward and Toohey JJ than does the weight placed by the other Federal 
Court Justices on disclosure, and his Honour’s position is here supported by Lord Reid’s 
observations that before the Courts exercise their power regarding procedural fairness, “it 
must be clear that the statutory procedure is insufficient to achieve justice and that to require 
additional steps would not frustrate the apparent purpose of the legislation”.51 
 
Conclusion: procedural fairness as “whitefella law”?  
In her review of the Heritage Act, Elizabeth Evatt recommends statutory provision for 
confidentiality, a more generous time frame, allowance for the Minister to delegate some 
aspects of the “consideration” process, and a separate, above all non-adversarial process of 
assessment of the question of Aboriginal significance.52 Justice Carr’s defense against the 
concept of “whitefella law”, that it is law “for all Australians regardless of their colour”, is thus 
sustainable to the extent that the Australian legal system seems, in principle, capable of 
                                                 
 49  ibid at 256 
 50 Burchett J indicated that although “the additional failure to consider the representation regarding the 
“women’s business” was not the ground of the decision,” it does, however, “raise important questions” Norvill v 
Chapman note 5 at 254 
 51 Wiseman v Borneman [1971] AC 297 at 308, emphasis added 
 52 Evatt, E, Review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/special/rsjproject/rsjlibrary/evatt/index.html> 
establishing rules for the operation of procedural fairness and democratic participation in 
governance which can be regarded as just and legitimate by all the affected parties. 
 Why, then, did Mr Sebastian make the “whitefella law” remark? Because the political 
and legal theory operative within the principles governing procedural fairness depend in their 
turn on an underlying or background social and cultural theory. How one understands the way 
participation and procedural fairness can and should operate is itself based on a particular 
conception of society, the person, knowledge and property. In particular, one can operate 
with either a “contracted” view of social relations, a universalistic one in which real, existing 
economic and political interests as well as social relations of power recede from view, and the 
world is composed only of more or less equal citizens and agencies of government, or with an 
“expanded” view which recognizes prior interests and power relations and the position of the 
law within that field of unequal interests and power. 
 While it is true that there is not an irreconcilable conflict between “whitefella” law and 
Aboriginal law, the actual operation of Australian law can look, feel and taste remarkably like 
“whitefella” law when legislatures and Courts work with the “contracted” view of social 
relations, keeping the existing power relations of settler-colonialism invisible, and pretending 
that the rights of property developers to make money should be thought about in more or less 
the same way as the rights of individuals about to be deported. In Norvill v Chapman, for 
example, Justice Burchett said: 
But Aboriginals, just like all their fellow members of the community, if they wish to 
avail themselves of legal remedies, must do so on the law’s terms.  To take away the 
rights of other persons on the basis of a claim that could not be revealed to the maker 
of the decision himself would be to set those rights at nought in a way not even the 
Inquisition ever attempted.53 
 
Apart from raising the eyebrows of any student of the Inquisition,54 this particular 
formulation, coming hard on the heels of his Honour’s citation of Woodward and Toohey JJ’s 
settling of this question in the Aboriginal Sacred Sites case, suggests a particular sort of 
                                                 
 53 Norvill v Chapman note 5 at 254, per Burchett J 
 54 See, for example, Kamen, H, The Spanish Inquisition (London: Phoenix, 1998) 
underlying lack of sympathy for the confidentiality concerns.55 It is particularly significant in 
revealing the profound ambivalence within Australian legal thought, given that his Honour 
then proceeded to propose precisely the practical solution to the “women’s business” problem, 
namely, appointing a second, female, Minister or member of the Executive Council. 
 Australian courts thus seem to be sending out contradictory messages. One the one 
hand, “the significance of areas and objects of profound cultural and spiritual significance to 
Aboriginals” should be appreciated, and the interests of settlers/develops should not prevail 
“without any proper or informed consideration of the interests of Aboriginals”.56 On the other 
hand, rules governing such consideration are established which set out from a presumption of 
equality in social, political and economic relations, rather than the reality of settler-colonial 
inequality, tending to produce outcomes in which legislative attempts to effect such 
consideration remain largely ineffective. Participation and procedural fairness thus end up 
becoming merely the battleground upon which those power relations are fought out by other, 
legal, means. 
 
 Stanley Fish has recently suggested that “the trouble with principle” is that it can be 
mobilised in relation to such a wide variety of concerns, within varying contexts, and he notes 
its “transverse” character, its ability to be utilized in support of outcomes which by most other 
criteria would be regarded as contradictory, when Courts try to treat social context as if it 
does not matter.57 The question this argument raises in relation to the Australian Courts’ 
jurisprudence of natural justice, looking at Norvill v Chapman and the other Heritage Act 
cases, is whether the protection of the rights, interests and legitimate expectations of 
individuals accused of crimes and threatened with deportation, entrepreneurs, property 
developers, refugees, insurance companies and so on according to a universal set of 
democratic principles might not have a paradoxical operation, making Australian law 
“whitefella” law despite all the Courts’ best intentions. There can be no doubt that Australian 
                                                 
 55 It is also a formulation encouraging the less ambiguously hostile interpretation in Partington, G, 
“Determining sacred sites - the case of the Hindmarsh Island Bridge” (1995) 71(5): Current Affairs Bulletin 4-11 
 56 Tickner v Bropho (1993) 114 ALR 409 at 419, per Black CJ 
courts understand that refugees and property developers are not really interchangeable, but it 
remains unclear what conclusions they can and should draw from this understanding. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 57 Fish note 10; a similar point was made by Carol Smart in Feminism and the Power of Law (London: 
Routledge, 1989) 
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